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[freehaven-cvs] more cleanups
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03
Modified Files:
econymics.tex
Log Message:
more cleanups
Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.12
retrieving revision 1.13
diff -u -d -r1.12 -r1.13
--- econymics.tex 15 Sep 2002 19:00:30 -0000 1.12
+++ econymics.tex 15 Sep 2002 19:50:14 -0000 1.13
@@ -243,7 +243,8 @@
For each complete strategy profile $s=\left( s_{1},...,s_{n}\right) $, each
player receives a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility $u_{i}\left( s\right) $.
-The payoff function $u_{i}$ is based on several potential benefits and costs:
+The payoff function $u_{i}$ is based on a variety of benefits and costs. The
+benefits include:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Benefits of sending messages anonymously. We model them as a function
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@
\item The number of users of the system is positively correlated to the
level of anonymity of the system.
-\item Acting as a node (which we represent as $a_{i}^{s}=1$, under the
+\item Acting as a node (which we represent as $a_{i}^{h}=1$, under the
assumption that the honest node is interested in its own anonymity) is
strongly positively correlated to preserving the anonymity of one's
information. For example, suppose agents send
@@ -337,48 +338,48 @@
implicit costs such as the time needed to configure messages in order for
them to be used in the system, or delays incurred when using the system.
These delays should be positively correlated to the traffic $n_{s}$ and
-negatively correlated to the number of nodes $n_{h}$. In addition, when
+negatively correlated to the number of nodes $n_{h}$.
+% FIXME is this right? -RD
+In addition, when
message delivery is guaranteed, a node might always choose a longer route to
reduce risk. We could assign a higher $c_{s}$ to longer routes to reflect
-the cost of additional delay;
+the cost of additional delay.
-\item or through a conventional, non anonymous system, $c_{n}$;
+\item or through a conventional, non anonymous system, $c_{n}$.
\end{itemize}
\item receiving dummy traffic, $c_{r}$.
\end{itemize}
-\item Costs of acting as an honest node, $c_{h}$ by receiving and
-forwarding traffic, creating dummy traffic, and being an exit node
-(which involves potential exposure to liabilities or abuses);
-
-Here we note that there are both fixed and variable costs of being a
-node. The fixed costs are related to the investments necessary to setup the
-software. The variable costs are dominated by the costs of traffic passing
-through the node.
+\item Costs of acting as an honest node, $c_{h}$, by receiving and
+forwarding traffic, creating dummy traffic, and being an exit node (which
+involves potential exposure to liabilities or abuses). There are both
+fixed and variable costs of being a node. The fixed costs are related
+to the investments necessary to setup the software. The variable costs
+are dominated by the costs of traffic passing through the node.
\item Costs of acting as dishonest node, $c_{d}$ (e.g., being exposed as a
dishonest node carries a monetary penalty).
\end{enumerate}
-In addition to the above costs and benefits, there might be also \textit{%
-reputation} costs and benefits from:\
+In addition to the above costs and benefits, there might also be
+\emph{reputation} costs and benefits from:
\begin{itemize}
\item using the system to send messages (e.g., there can be a reputation
cost of being exposed as a sender of anonymous messages even though the
messages themselves do remain anonymous),
-\item acting as perceivably honest node (e.g., there can be a reputation
-benefit by acting as node),
+\item acting as a perceivably honest node (e.g., there can be a reputation
+benefit by acting as a reliable node),
-\item acting as perceivably dishonest node (e.g., there can be a reputation
-cost by being exposed as a dishonest node, and the costs here will be also
+\item acting as a perceivably dishonest node (e.g., there can be a reputation
+cost by being exposed as a dishonest node; the costs here will also be a
function of the probability of being exposed as a bad node).
\end{itemize}
-However, these reputation costs and benefits can be simply considered
-``internal'' to the system (e.g., being perceived as a honest node brings
+These reputation costs and benefits can be considered ``internal''
+to the system (for example, being perceived as a honest node brings
that node more traffic, and therefore more possibilities to hide that node's
messages; similarly, being perceived as a dishonest node might bring traffic
away from that node). In this case they will not enter directly the utility
@@ -386,8 +387,8 @@
provoke in the behavior of the agents.
We assume that agents want to maximize their expected utility, which is
-function of expected benefits minus expected costs. We represent the payoff
-function\ for each agent $i$ in the following compact form:
+a function of expected benefits minus expected costs. We represent the payoff
+function for each agent $i$ in the following compact form:
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}=u\left( \theta \left[ \gamma \left( v_{r},p_{r}\left(
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