[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[freehaven-cvs] minor edits plus a draft introduction
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03
In directory moria.seul.org:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/fc03
Modified Files:
econymics.bib econymics.tex
Log Message:
minor edits plus a draft introduction
Index: econymics.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -d -r1.1 -r1.2
--- econymics.bib 13 Sep 2002 00:40:21 -0000 1.1
+++ econymics.bib 13 Sep 2002 00:57:13 -0000 1.2
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
+@Misc{anonymizer,
+ key = {anonymizer},
+ title = {{T}he {A}nonymizer},
+ howpublished = {$<$\texttt{http://www.anonymizer.com/}$>$}
+}
+
@InProceedings{Diaz02,
author = {Claudia Diaz and Stefaan Seys and Joris Claessens
and Bart Preneel},
@@ -10,6 +16,13 @@
}
+@Book{diffiebook,
+ author = {Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau},
+ title = {Privacy On the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and
+ Encryption},
+ publisher = {MIT Press},
+ year = 1998
+}
@Article{fudenberg88,
author = {Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine},
@@ -31,9 +44,6 @@
editor = {Paul Syverson and Roger Dingledine},
publisher = {Springer Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)}
}
-
-
-
@InProceedings{trickle02,
author = {Andrei Serjantov and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
Index: econymics.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/fc03/econymics.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -d -r1.1 -r1.2
--- econymics.tex 13 Sep 2002 00:40:21 -0000 1.1
+++ econymics.tex 13 Sep 2002 00:57:14 -0000 1.2
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+
%\documentclass{article}
\documentclass{llncs}
\usepackage{epsfig}
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@
\author{Alessandro Acquisti\inst{1} \and Roger Dingledine\inst{2} \and Paul Syverson\inst{3}}
\institute{SIMS, UC Berkeley
\email{(acquisti@sims.berkeley.edu)}
+\and
The Free Haven Project
\email{(arma@mit.edu)}
\and
@@ -87,28 +89,77 @@
\email{(syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)}}
\maketitle
-\workingnote{
-\documentclass[10pt,a4paper]{article}
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-\usepackage{epsfig}
-\usepackage{graphicx}
-\usepackage{amsmath}
-%TCIDATA{OutputFilter=LATEX.DLL}
-%TCIDATA{LastRevised=Mon Sep 09 11:35:19 2002}
-%TCIDATA{<DEFANGED_META NAME="GraphicsSave" CONTENT="32">}
-%TCIDATA{Language=American English}
-%TCIDATA{CSTFile=article.cst}
+\section{Introduction and motivation}
-\input{tcilatex}
+Anonymity in communication over networks---such as the Internet---has
+received alot of technical attention and is widely (though not
+uncontroversially) regarded as both desirable and necessary. People
+want to be able to surf the Web, purchase online, send email, etc.\
+without revealing their information, interests, and activities to
+others. This is all the more true for corporate and military entities.
+It might thus seem that there is a ready market for services in this
+area. It should be possible to offer such services and develop a
+paying customer base. However, with one notable exception, the
+Anonymizer \cite{anonymizer}, commercial offerings in this area have
+not met with sustained success. Part of this can no doubt be
+attributed to the still relatively new and uncharted aspects of any
+commercial online services, and part can be attributed to the current
+economic environment in general. However, this is not the whole story.
-\begin{document}
+Single-hop web proxies like the Anonymizer do seem sufficient to
+protect end users from simple threats like profile-creating websites.
+Thus another aspect of this is that the market is not as big as might
+be thought. Further, anonymity systems actually use messages to hide
+among each other. So from an anonymity perspective, you're always
+better off going where the noise is provided. Whether or not people do
+so intentionally, there may be good anonymity reasons for having fewer
+providers. Also note that when you send a message you are both a
+consumer and provider of anonymity. We will return to both of these
+points below.
-\title{Open Issues in the Economics of Anonymity - Some formal comments}
-\author{}
-\maketitle
-}
+High traffic is necessary for strong anonymity. High traffic and
+better performance complement each other: a system that processes only
+a few messages at a time must delay service to achieve adequately
+large anonymity sets. Better performance attracts users both for its
+convenience value and the better potential anonymity protection. But
+this does not simply mean that systems processing the most traffic
+provide the best hiding. If trust is not well distributed, a high
+volume system is a point of vulnerability, from insiders and attackers
+who try to bridge the trust bottlenecks. Systems must also be robust
+against active attacks, e.g., trickle attacks in which known traffic
+is mixed with targeted traffic \cite{trickle02}.
+
+Also, censorship-resistant publishing systems, and to some extent any
+Internet sites that aim to be resistant to DDoS, can benefit from
+\emph{location protection} of their servers --- effectively hiding
+them behind several levels of indirection so the location or IP is
+hidden from direct attack. Indeed, for companies that \emph{are}
+protecting high-value corporate information, relying on firewalls,
+VPNs, and encrypted communication may not be quite the right
+approach. Whit Diffie has remarked that traffic analysis is the
+backbone of communications intelligence, not cryptanalysis
+\cite{diffiebook}. Perhaps there is a need for strong anonymity,
+but this has simply not been recognized or been given a viable business
+model.
+This paper is intended to explore the incentives of agents to both
+offer and use anonymity services, thus to set a foundation for
+understanding speculations such as above. We will primarily be
+focussed on the strategic motivations of honest agents. The
+motivations of dishonest agents are at least as important. For
+example, note that an anonymity-breaking adversary with an adequate
+budget would do best to provide very good service, possibly also
+attempting DoS against other high-quality providers. None of the usual
+metrics of performance and efficiency will help tell who the bad guys
+are in this instance. Further, who assigns those metrics and how? If
+they depend on a centralized trusted authority, the advantages of
+diffusion are lost. But, a reliability-breaking adversary will
+obviously have very different goals and approaches. The complexity of
+representing both honest and dishonest agents strategically is beyond
+the scope of the current study, thus dishonest agents are just
+part of a given \emph{adversary}, a context within which strategic
+agents must operate.
\section{General view}
***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs in the body. http://freehaven.net/