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[freehaven-cvs] tweaks on secs 1 and 2

To: freehaven-cvs@freehaven.net
Subject: [freehaven-cvs] tweaks on secs 1 and 2
From: arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2004 14:47:01 -0500 (EST)
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Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/freehaven/doc/routing-zones

Modified Files:
	routing-zones.bib routing-zones.tex 
Log Message:
tweaks on secs 1 and 2


Index: routing-zones.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.15
retrieving revision 1.16
diff -u -d -r1.15 -r1.16
--- routing-zones.bib	28 Jan 2004 19:10:44 -0000	1.15
+++ routing-zones.bib	28 Jan 2004 19:46:59 -0000	1.16
@@ -4,6 +4,24 @@
   note = {\url{http://www.palfrader.org/echolot/}},
 }
 
+@Misc{anonymizer,
+  key =          {anonymizer},
+  title =        {The {Anonymizer}},
+  note =         {\url{http://anonymizer.com/}}
+}
+
+@InProceedings{web-mix,
+   author =      {Oliver Berthold and Hannes Federrath and Stefan K\"opsell},
+   title =       {Web {MIX}es: A system for anonymous and unobservable
+                  {I}nternet access}, 
+  booktitle =    {Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Workshop
+                  on Design Issue in Anonymity and Unobservability},
+   editor =       {H. Federrath},
+   publisher =    {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009},
+   pages =       {115--129},
+   year =        {2000},
+}
+
 @techreport{freedom21-security,
   title = {Freedom Systems 2.1 Security Issues and Analysis}, 
   author = {Adam Back and Ian Goldberg and Adam Shostack}, 
@@ -292,7 +310,7 @@
 
 @Misc{www-comscore,
   key = 	 {comscore},
-  Title = 	 {comScore Media Metrix Announces Top 50 U.S. Internet Property Rankings for December 2003},
+  Title = 	 {{comScore Media Metrix Announces Top 50 U.S. Internet Property Rankings for December 2003}},
   howpublished = {\url{http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=402}},
   month = 	 {January 14, },
   year = 	 {2004},

Index: routing-zones.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/routing-zones/routing-zones.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.39
retrieving revision 1.40
diff -u -d -r1.39 -r1.40
--- routing-zones.tex	28 Jan 2004 19:12:15 -0000	1.39
+++ routing-zones.tex	28 Jan 2004 19:46:59 -0000	1.40
@@ -138,14 +138,12 @@
 random node selection are likely to be observed by a single AS between
 10\% and 30\% of the time, depending on the location of the initiator
 and responder, and that the single AS that can observe these paths is
-always a backbone ISP.  We conclude that with a small change in the node
-selection algorithm, users of these networks can minimize the likelihood
-that their entry path and exit path traverse the same AS.
+always a backbone ISP.  We conclude that a slightly different node
+selection algorithm can allow users of these networks to minimize the
+likelihood that their entry path and exit path traverse the same AS.
 
 \section{Background}
 
-%we provide necessary background information on
-%anonymizing networks and on Internet routing.
 We first describe the different types of mix networks and present a brief
 explanation of the types of attacks that each type of mix network must
 protect against.  Because we argue that designers of mix networks
@@ -163,22 +161,25 @@
 toward their destinations.
 
 Subsequent anonymity systems have diverged in two directions. Systems
-like Babel~\cite{babel}, Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec}, and
+like Babel~\cite{babel}, Mixmaster, and
 Mixminion~\cite{minion-design} aim to defend against powerful adversaries,
 but at
 the cost of requiring high and variable latency. Other systems, such as
-Onion Routing or its successor Tor~\cite{tor-design,or-jsac98} and the
+Onion Routing, its successor Tor, and the
 Freedom network~\cite{freedom2-arch}, support
 low-latency transactions such as web browsing, but necessarily have a
-weaker threat model.
+weaker threat model. Onion Routing and Freedom differ from single-hop
+proxies like the Anonymizer~\cite{anonymizer} or fixed-path topologies
+like Web Mixes~\cite{web-mix} in that they aim to achieve as much
+diversity in node placement and path selection as possible.
 
 Anonymity networks aim to protect against a wide variety of both passive
 and active attacks~\cite{back01,raymond00}. Such attacks generally
 fall into two categories: attacks inside the network and endpoint
 attacks. Attacks inside the network aim to partition anonymity sets
 through passive observation~\cite{disad-free-routes,minion-design}
-or active traffic manipulation~\cite{trickle02}, or otherwise reduce
-the set of suspects for a given transaction. Endpoint attacks treat the
+or active traffic manipulation~\cite{trickle02}, or otherwise narrow
+out suspects for a given transaction. Endpoint attacks treat the
 network as a black box and consider only the entry node and exit node
 for the transaction; such attacks include simple timing and counting
 attacks against low-latency systems~\cite{defensive-dropping,SS03},
@@ -201,7 +202,7 @@
 each peer~\cite{freedman:ccs02,morphmix:fc04} (our results show that
 this technique is ineffective). In this paper, we evaluate the
 topologies of {\em real anonymity networks in the context of the
-properties of Internet routing at the AS-level} and design ways to
+properties of Internet routing at the AS-level}, and design ways to
 quantify the results.
 
 \subsection{Overview of Internet Routing and Topology}
@@ -210,7 +211,7 @@
 of a mix network, we must first understand how packets are routed
 between two arbitrary hosts on the Internet.  In this section, we first
 present a brief overview of interdomain routing (i.e., routing between
-ISPs) on the Internet. We then describe available data on Internet
+ISPs) on the Internet, and then describe available data on Internet
 topologies and our assumptions regarding how well this data reflects the
 paths that packets actually travel.
 
@@ -404,7 +405,7 @@
 \label{sec:path-selection}
 
 To build a path in an anonymity network, clients must somehow discover a set
-of currently available nodes. In Mixmaster, clients examine the output
+of current nodes. In Mixmaster, clients examine the output
 of ``pinger'' software that measures node reliability and publishes keys
 and addresses for each remailer~\cite{echolot}. In Tor, clients download
 a similar network snapshot from special nodes called directory
@@ -415,8 +416,8 @@
 from this node (some operators choose instead to be \emph{middleman} nodes,
 to avoid needing to deal with abuse complaints.)
 
-We abstract the details of fetching this list: assume Alice ends up
-with a set $N$ of possible choices, of which $E \subseteq N$ are exit nodes.
+We abstract how Alice gets the list: assume she has
+a set $N$ of possible choices, of which $E \subseteq N$ are exit nodes.
 Also assume that all nodes in the network are listed as working (typically
 some nodes are listed as temporarily offline).
 

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