[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[freehaven-cvs] a few more tweaks, waiting for nick"s checkin
Update of /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home/arma/work/freehaven/doc/econp2p03
Modified Files:
econp2p03.bib econp2p03.tex
Log Message:
a few more tweaks, waiting for nick's checkin
Index: econp2p03.bib
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03/econp2p03.bib,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- econp2p03.bib 1 Apr 2003 09:11:20 -0000 1.2
+++ econp2p03.bib 1 Apr 2003 11:04:19 -0000 1.3
@@ -97,3 +97,17 @@
pages = "173-199",
}
+@InProceedings{shuffle,
+ author = {C. Andrew Neff},
+ title = {A Verifiable Secret Shuffle and its Application to E-Voting},
+ booktitle = {8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
+ Security (CCS-8)},
+ pages = {116--125},
+ year = 2001,
+ editor = {P. Samarati},
+ month = {November},
+ publisher = {ACM Press},
+ note = {\url{http://www.votehere.net/ada_compliant/ourtechnology/
+ technicaldocs/shuffle.pdf}},
+}
+
Index: econp2p03.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/freehaven/cvsroot/doc/econp2p03/econp2p03.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.2
retrieving revision 1.3
diff -u -d -r1.2 -r1.3
--- econp2p03.tex 1 Apr 2003 09:11:20 -0000 1.2
+++ econp2p03.tex 1 Apr 2003 11:04:19 -0000 1.3
@@ -29,9 +29,12 @@
\title{Reputation in P2P Anonymity Systems}
-\author{Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\
-\{arma,nickm\}@freehaven.net \and Paul Syverson \\ Naval Research Lab \\
-syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil}
+\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and Nick Mathewson\inst{1} \and Paul Syverson\inst{2}}
+\institute{The Free Haven Project
+\email{(\{arma,nickm\}@freehaven.net)}
+\and
+Naval Research Lab
+\email{(syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil)}}
\maketitle
\pagestyle{plain}
@@ -146,8 +149,7 @@
This reputation system attempts to improve reliability in a long-term
sense, rather than giving provable delivery guarantees for each
-message.
-[cite all those provable mix papers]
+message, a la \cite{shuffle}.
On the other hand, it still relies both on proofs of correct
behavior to establish reputations, and trusted witnesses to determine
and keep track of them. The reputation system in \cite{casc-rep} does
@@ -267,19 +269,17 @@
\section{Reputation and Anonymity}
Although the examples described above associate non-transferable
-reputation with long-lived pseudonyms, there are many ways to vary this
-formula. Entities may be anonymous or have only short-lived names;
-reputations may be short-lived or transferable; and bindings between
-pseudonyms, entities, and reputations may be varied.
-
-nym, pseudonym
+reputation with long-lived pseudonyms (nyms for short), there are many
+ways to vary this formula. Entities may be anonymous or have only
+short-lived names; reputations may be short-lived or transferable;
+and bindings between nyms, entities, and reputations may be varied.
We have already noted that in Free Haven, a server can both acquire and
spend reputation. A central register or registers can keep track of each
server's current reputation credit level, or each server can maintain its
own view of the system. It is a small step from here to consider systems
in which reputation can be paid in the form of coins or tokens. With such
a system, the same entity can maintain reputation even while changing
-pseudonyms. An entity that holds different pseudonyms in different
+nyms. An entity that holds different nyms in different
contexts can benefit from this feature -- either to preserve reputation
independent of private key compromise, or to maintain perfect forward
anonymity (future compromises linking a nym to an entity will not reveal
***********************************************************************
To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo@seul.org with
unsubscribe freehaven-cvs in the body. http://freehaven.net/